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SCHAD v ARIZONA:
JURY UNANIMITY ON TRIAL
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause' guarantees every de-
fendant the right to a fair trial.2 Accordingly, government prosecutions
must follow criminal procedures that allow a defendant to defend himself
adequately against the pending charges.3 The due process protections re-
quired to ensure a fair trial, however, vary in relation to the nature of the
charges that a defendant faces.4 For example, in the context of state crimi-
nal trials for death penalty offenses,' the Supreme Court of the United States
1. The Due Process Clause reads, "[n]o State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury." U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI.
However, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause does not incorporate each specific
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1942), overruled on
other grounds by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Since "trial by jury in criminal
cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice," the Due Process Clause applies this
particular Sixth Amendment right to the states. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149
(1968). However, "due process" does not guarantee a defendant the right to a unanimous jury
verdict for all state criminal cases. See infra note 6.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in applying the Due Process Clause to the states,
has held that the majority of the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights are also properly
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of due process. See Gideon, 372 U.S.
at 342 (applying to the states the Fifth Amendment right to counsel); Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23, 34 (1963) (adjudicating state "searches" by the Fourth Amendment standard for
"searches"); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (applying the Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the states); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 655 (1961) (applying to the states the Fourth Amendment right to exclude all evidence
from trial that authorities obtained in "unreasonable ... searches and seizures").
3. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.6 (2d ed.
1992) (discussing the fact that although the criminal penal system requires fair procedures, it
must also apply these procedures to gain public approval).
4. See infra notes 8, 13. See generally United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 903 (2d
Cir. 1960) (explaining that due process ignores inconsistencies of a jury verdict in a criminal
setting, but not in a civil case).
5. In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam), the Supreme Court restruc-
tured capital sentencing, holding that the death penalty imposed by unchecked discretion in
the sentencing phase constitutes a "cruel and unusual punishment" under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 240.
The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See
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requires that the jury reach a unanimous verdict.6 In a death penalty case,
therefore, all jury members must agree that the defendant committed the
major aspects of the crime as defined by the state statute, provided that the
statute falls within the parameters of the Constitution.7
The Court imposes stricter procedures in death penalty cases because the
seriousness of the offense threatens a defendant's very existence.' There is
no remedy for error in sentencing a defendant to death.9 In order to reduce
the possibility of irreversible error, the jury as a whole, must confront and
overcome the doubts of each individual juror before announcing a guilty
Michael J. Crowley, Comment, Jury Coercion in Capital Cases: How Much Risk Are We Will-
ing to Take?, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1073, 1075-76 (1989) (discussing death penalty statutes in the
wake of Furman). As a result of Furman, thirty-seven states either enacted or revised their
death penalty statutes. Id.
6. Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491, 2496 (1991). However, the Supreme Court has
held that it does not require unanimity in state non-capital criminal trials. Apodaca v. Oregon,
406 U.S. 404, 411 (1972) (rejecting the argument that the Sixth Amendment mandates that the
jury must attain unanimity in non-capital cases); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 363
(1972) (upholding the Louisiana law that allows a jury to convict a defendant based upon a
non-unanimous verdict in non-capital cases). The Apodaca and Johnson decisions abridged
"an accepted feature of the common-law jury"-unanimity. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 407-08. See
Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948) (holding that Sixth Amendment cases re-
quire a unanimous jury verdict); American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 468 (1897)
(holding that the court erred in accepting a non-unanimous verdict in a civil case). Further-
more, some states allow a defendant to waive his right to a unanimous jury. See Elizabeth F.
Loftus & Edith Greene, Twelve Angry People.- The Collective Mind of the Jury, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1425, 1427-28 & n.8 (1984) (reviewing REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983)
(discussing various modifications to the unanimity rule on both the state and federal levels)).
In contrast, the Court requires unanimity for all federal criminal cases, a right that a defendant
cannot waive. Id. at 1427, n.6; FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a).
7. See Andres, 333 U.S. at 748 (requiring jury unanimity on all issues-the degree of the
crime, the defendant's guilt, as well as the punishment); see also supra note 6. However, even
if the prosecutor succcessfully proves each element of the crime, the conviction is void if the
state statute deprives the defendant of his constitutional rights as incorporated by the Due
Process Clause. See, e.g., LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 3, § 2.5.
8. See Crowley, supra note 5, at 1073; see also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 467-70
& n.3 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). In Spaziano, Justice Stevens
emphasized the gravity of death penalty cases as follows:
In the 12 years since Furman v. Georgia, every Member of this Court has written
or joined at least one opinion endorsing the proposition that because of its severity
and irrevocability, the death penalty is qualitatively different from any other punish-
ment, and hence must be accompanied by unique safeguards to ensure that it is a
justified response to a given offense.
Id. at 468 (citation and footnote omitted). See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)
(noting that individual treatment is essential in death penalty cases because of the unavailablity
of parole, probation, or work furloughs once a defendant is executed). See also infra note 215.
9. See Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 468.
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verdict."° This requirement protects defendants in death penalty cases from
excessive and random aggression by the prosecutors. 1
As an additional safeguard for avoiding error in criminal prosecutions, the
Court in In re Winship 2 required that the prosecutor bear the burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, 3 including
the actus reus, or the guilty act,' 4 and the mental component known as the
mens rea.l" Thus, in order to convict a defendant of premeditated first-de-
gree murder, 16 the prosecutor must prove that the defendant had the requi-
site mens rea of intending to kill the victim,' 7 that the defendant harbored
malice in reflecting upon his desire to kill the victim,'" and that he physically
performed the actus reus of killing the victim.' 9
10. See Loftus & Greene, supra note 6, at 1429. "[N]onunanimous juries need not debate
and deliberate as fully as must unanimous juries. As soon as the requisite majority is attained,
further consideration is not required by Oregon or by Louisiana even though the dissident
jurors might, if given the chance, be able to convince the majority." Id. (quoting Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 388 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). The absence of a full and com-
plete deliberation increases the risk of an incorrect conviction.
11. See United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1960). The law requires the
jury to speak together in one voice as "the opinion of the country." Id. (quoting 2 FREDERICK
POLLOCK & FREDERICK W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW FROM THE TIME
OF EDWARD I 624 (London, Cambridge University Press 1968) (1st ed. 1895). See supra note
6.
12. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
13. Id. at 368. This is a more demanding standard than required to prove liability in a
civil action. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 38 (5th ed. 1984); EDWARD W. CLEARY ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 339 (3d ed.
1984). In tort law, the plaintiff generally bears the burden of proof by the preponderance of
the evidence. In contrast, the prosecutor has the higher burden of proof in a criminal trial to
prove the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The law presumes the innocence of the accused
unless the prosecutor can prove otherwise. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 452-53
(1895), overruled on other grounds by Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36 (1897).
14. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has also required that state
legislatures draft the actus reus element of a statute with sufficient specificity to enable a jury
to be in "substantial agreement" as to the precise act of the defendant. United States v. Gip-
son, 553 F.2d 453, 457-58 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1977). See infra text accompanying infra notes 97-
106.
15. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 36 (6th ed. 1990). "The actus reus [guilty act] is the
physical aspect of a crime, whereas the mens rea (guilty mind) involves the intent factor." Id.
16. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 7.7 (2d
ed. 1986) (setting forth the concept of multiple categories or degrees of murder).
17. See Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491, 2508 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (quoting the
prosecutor's closing arguments to the jury).
18. Id.
19. Id. In contrast, second-degree murder lacks premeditation, but includes the intent to
create serious bodily injury, or extremely negligent conduct. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 16,
§ 7.7(e). It sometimes encompasses felony murder where the felony is not " 'inherently dan-
gerous.' " Id. § 7.5(b). See also State v. Lacquey, 571 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Ariz. 1977) (quoting
Arizona Revised Statute § 13-451(B) in holding that murder with an" 'abandoned and malig-
nant heart' " constitutes second-degree murder); People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 133
19931
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In contrast to the Winship requirement that the prosecutor prove a de-
fendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,2° the concept of felony murder
allows the prosecutor to avoid proving every element of the crime. 21 To
convict a defendant of felony murder, the jury must agree that the defendant
participated in a felony22 and that someone was killed during the course of
that felony.23 The felony murder doctrine automatically assumes that if a
defendant had the requisite mens rea to commit the underlying felony, then
he also had the necessary mens rea for first-degree murder.24 Felony murder
does not require a defendant to commit the actus reus of physically killing
the victim. 25 Instead, the actus reus is his participation in the underlying
felony. 26 The law holds the felon strictly responsible for the fatal conse-
(Cal. 1965) (holding that if a felony is "inherently dangerous," the felony murder doctrine
assumes that the defendant had the malice aforethought necessary for first-degree murder).
20. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
21. See LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 16, § 7.7(b). See also, Note, Felony Murder: A Tort
Law Reconceptualization, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1918, 1919 (1986) (asserting that felony murder
defendants receive less procedural protections than defendants in wrongful death cases). Some
courts reason that the intent to commit the felony supplies the intent to kill, resulting in pre-
meditated murder. See, e.g., Simpson v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.2d 869, 869 (Ky. 1943)
(holding that the intent to perpetrate the felony supplied the elements of malice and intent to
murder, even though the accused did not contemplate death); People v. Olsen, 22 P. 125, 126
(Cal. 1889) (explaining that if the killing took place during the commission or attempt of a
felony and as a result of conspiracy, felonious intent attached to the killing).
Many courts, however, view felony murder as separate from premeditated murder. See, e.g.,
Guam v. Root, 524 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that felony murder does not unconstitu-
tionally presume intent), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1076 (1976); State v. Crump, 654 P.2d 922,
926-27 (Kan. 1982) (rejecting constitutional attacks on the felony murder doctrine).
22. See, e.g., LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 16, § 7.5. In State v. McLoughlin, 679 P.2d
504, 508-09 (Ariz. 1984), the Arizona Supreme Court held that the state legislature could
impose the same criminal charges upon a defendant who participated in any one of certain
named felonies as one who committed premeditated murder. Id. The state, however, must
prove the mens rea for the underlying felony, even if the defendant did not have a specific
intent to kill. Id. See also State v. Arias, 641 P.2d 1285, 1288 (Ariz. 1982) (holding that first-
degree murder is only one crime, regardless of whether it occurs as premeditated murder or
felony murder).
23. LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 16, § 7.5.
24. Id. The mens rea to commit the underlying felony transfers to the mens rea for pre-
meditated first-degree murder. Id. As a matter of strict liability, the crime consists only of an
actus reus; the mens rea is not part of the offense. Id. This type of crime gained widespread
acceptance in recent years for such matters as traffic tickets, drug and alcohol laws, and food
regulation. Id. The Supreme Court has imposed very few due process limitations on strict
liability crimes, which in turn has encouraged state legislatures to create such crimes. See Ann
Hopkins, Comment, Mens Rea and the Right to Trial by Jury, 76 CAL. L. REV. 391, 397
(1988) (discussing why legislatures created the concept of strict liability).
25. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157-58 (1987) (holding that the Eighth Amend-
ment allows states to impose the death penalty if the defendant possesses a mental state of
reckless indifference to life but not the intent to kill, provided that the defendant was a major
participant); see also infra text accompanying notes 129-37.
26. Id. In essence, society judges the felon to be a "bad person" because of his involve-
ment in the underlying felony. See LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 16, § 7.5(h).
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quences that he may not have foreseen, committed, or even desired.27 The
only element that felony murder and premeditated murder share is that
someone was killed.28  Otherwise, both the mens rea and actus reus are
different.2 9
Nevertheless, a number of states, including Arizona, currently have first-
degree murder statutes that encompass both premeditated murder and fel-
ony murder as alternative theories for the crime of first-degree murder.3a
These statutes, which do not require the jury to agree unanimously upon
either theory, result in a unanimous generic verdict of either guilty or not
guilty. 3' Until recently, the Supreme Court had not questioned the constitu-
27. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 157. When the British originally created the felony murder
doctrine in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, mens rea was not as developed a concept
as it is now. As such, the focus of criminal litigation was on the resulting harm, not the
defendant's original intent. Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A
Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 448 n.12, 458 (1985); Case
Comment, Criminal Law-Homicide-Felony Murder-Felons Can Be Held Responsible
Under the New Jersey Murder Statute for the Death of An Innocent Party Killed by Police
Attempting to Apprehend the Felons, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 591, 593-96 (1970) (describing a
New Jersey statute that holds felons responsible for a third party killed in police pursuit); see
infra note 112.
28. See Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491, 2509 (1991).
29. Id.
30. This trend began with the landmark case of People v. Sullivan, 65 N.E. 989, 989-90
(N.Y. 1903) (holding that "it was not necessary that all jurors should agree in the determina-
tion that there was a deliberate and premeditated design to take the life of the deceased, or in
the conclusion that the defendant was at the time engaged in the commission of a felony, or an
attempt to commit one"). In fact, the drafting of first-degree murder statutes to encompass
both theories has actually become commonplace in most jurisdictions. See Schad, 111 S. Ct. at
2502.
One rationale for this trend is the desire to avoid a situation in which a defendant, although
guilty of first-degree murder, is found innocent because the jury was unable to agree upon the
defendant's specific act. See Holland v. State, 280 N.W.2d 288, 293 (Wis. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 931 (1980). "To require unanimity as to the manner of participation would be to
frustrate the justice system, promote endless jury deliberations, encourage hung juries, and
precipitate retrials in an effort to find agreement on a nonessential issue." Id.
31. See People v. Milan, 507 P.2d 956, 961-62 (Cal. 1973) (holding that there is no error
in instructing the jury on both theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant com-
mitted first-degree murder as defined); People v. Travis, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (Ill. App. Ct.)
(stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not
the theory applied), appeal denied, 5 N.E.2d 260 (11. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024 (1989);
State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one
crime, although defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 552 P.2d
931, 936 (Kan. 1976) (holding that accused cannot impeach a verdict because the jury could
not agree upon the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick,
597 P.2d 1108 (Kan. 1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 141 N.E.2d 269, 275-76 (Mass. 1957)
(holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory);
People v. Embree, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Mich. 1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that
the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, jury instruction on unanimity is
irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 468 N.W.2d 589, 594 (Neb. 1991) (holding that the jury must
only agree that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which they
1993]
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tionality of these statutes.a2 In Schad v. Arizona,3a the Supreme Court con-
sidered an Arizona statute3 4 that permitted the jury to find a defendant
guilty of first-degree murder without specifying felony murder or premedi-
tated murder. 3
After discovering a strangled body on the side of an Arizona highway,
police arrested Edward Schad, Jr., for parole violation and possession of the
victim's Cadillac.36 In searching the Cadillac, police discovered the victim's
wallet, two of his credit cards, and other personal items identified as belong-
ing to the victim.37 The grand jury indicted Schad for first-degree murder
based on both premeditated murder and felony murder." A unanimous jury
reached that verdict); James v. State, 637 P.2d 862, 865-66 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981); State v.
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree upon either
theory if there is sufficient evidence to support either); see also Brown v. State, 473 So. 2d 1260,
1265 (Fla. 1985) (rejecting argument that the court should have distributed special verdict
forms to the jury to indicate the theory of first-degree murder upon which they agreed), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1038 (1985). However, not all state courts have agreed to this statutory
construction. But see State v. Murray, 782 P.2d 157 (Or. 1989) (holding that trial court erred
injury instructions which offered alternative theories of murder); State v. Boots, 780 P.2d 725,
728-29 (Or. 1989) (holding that the jury must only agree upon the means by which the defend-
ant committed the murder).
With regard to second-degree murder, the Utah Supreme Court ruled in State v. Russell,
733 P.2d 162, 166-67 (Utah 1987), that a defendant still received a unanimous verdict even if
the jury did not agree upon the mens rea or the actus reus of the crime. See Recent Develop-
ments in Utah Law, 1988 UTAH L. REV. 149, 196.
32. On June 21, 1991, the Supreme Court handed down its first decision on the constitu-
tionality of such first-degree murder statutes with alternative theories. See Schad v. Arizona,
111 S. Ct. 2491 (1991).
33. 111 S. Ct. 2491 (1991).
34. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-452 (Supp. 1973) (quoted in Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2495
n.l), repealed by 1977 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 142, § 15 (effective Oct. 1, 1978). The statute read:
A murder which is perpetrated by means of poison or lying in wait, torture or by any
other kind of wilful, deliberate or premeditated killing, or which is committed in
avoiding or preventing lawful arrest or effecting an escape from legal custody, or in
the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape in the first degree, robbery,
burglary, kidnapping, or mayhem, or sexual molestation of a child under the age of
thirteen years, is murder of the first degree. All other kinds of murder are of the
second degree.
Schad, 111 S.Ct. at 2495 n. 1 (quoting § 13-452). The Arizona legislature revised the statute
but retained premeditated murder and felony murder as alternative theories of first-degree
murder. Id.; see ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105.A (1989).
35. Although Arizona's current first-degree murder statute offers only premeditated mur-
der and felony murder as possible theories, the earlier statute at issue in Schad v. Arizona
offered a third option: "committed in avoiding or preventing lawful arrest or effecting an es-
cape from legal custody." Schad, Ill S. Ct. at 2495 n.1 (quoting § 13-452).
36. State v. Schad, 633 P.2d 366, 370-71 (Ariz. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983
(1982).
37. Id. at 371. The police also discovered other items belonging to the victim inside the
petitioner's abandoned rental car. Id.
38. The felony murder theory was based on robbery or kidnapping. State v. Schad, 691
P.2d 710, 711 (Ariz. 1984), rev'd, 788 P.2d 1162 (Ariz. 1989).
[Vol. 42:355
19931 Schad v. Arizona
found Schad guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to death.3 9 On defend-
ant's post conviction petition," the Arizona Supreme Court reversed his
conviction on the grounds of improper jury instructions and remanded the
case.4" On remand, the jury again convicted Schad of first-degree murder
based on the alternative theories of premeditated and felony murder, with
robbery as the underlying felony.4 2 For a second time, Schad appealed his
conviction to the Arizona Supreme Court, claiming that due process re-
quired the jury to agree upon one particular theory of first-degree murder.
4 3
Finding no due process violation, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction and did not require the jury to agree upon one specific theory of
first-degree murder.' The court also rejected Schad's second argument that
due process required the judge to instruct the jury on robbery as a lesser
included offense of felony murder, even though the judge issued instructions
on second-degree murder as a lesser included offense of premeditated
murder.4"
The Supreme Court granted certiorari46 and, in a five to four plurality
opinion,4 7 affirmed Schad's conviction, refusing to require the jury to agree
39. Schad, 633 P.2d at 383.
40. Schad, 691 P.2d at 711.
41. Id. at 711-12. The judge failed to instruct the jury on the definitions of robbery and
kidnapping as the underlying felonies. Id. at 711. The Arizona Supreme Court found that this
omission constituted a "[flundamental error," occurring when the trial judge fails to instruct
the jury on issues that are crucial to a proper evaluation of the evidence. Id. at 711. The court
felt that since neither robbery nor kidnapping were ever defined, the jury was unable to prop-
erly evaluate the evidence for the felony murder charge. Id. at 711-12. But see State v. Laugh-
ter, 625 P.2d 327, 330 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that even if there is "fundamental error,"
reversal is only appropriate when the error has a prejudicial effect on the defendant).
42. See State v. Schad, 788 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Ariz. 1989), aff'd, Il1 S. Ct. 2491 (1991).
43. Id. at 1168. Schad asserted that the evidence obtained by the Arizona police "proved
at most that he was a thief, not a murderer." Schad v. Arizona, I11 S. Ct. 2491, 2495 (1991).
44. Schad, 788 P.2d at 1168.
45. Id. (quoting State v. Encinas, 647 P.2d 624, 627 (Ariz. 1982)). In death penalty cases,
the judge must instruct the jury on a lesser included offense that is non-capital in nature so that
the jury does not have to make an all-or-nothing choice of death or acquittal. See Beck v.
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 627 (1980) (holding that due process forbids the imposition of the
death penalty for a capital offense if the trial court did not give the jury the option of convict-
ing the defendant of a lesser included offense). The judge must not present the jury with the
impermissible "all-or-nothing choice" of either convicting a defendant of a death penalty of-
fense or completely acquitting him. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2505 (quoting Spaziano v. Florida,
468 U.S. 447, 455 (1984)). The Court does not want to render a guilty verdict merely because
a defendant committed a serious crime which society should punish. See Beck, 447 U.S. at
633-34; Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973) (advocating that a jury instruction
on a non-capital offense allows a defendant to enjoy the reasonable doubt standard to the
fullest extent). At the other extreme, the jury should not acquit a defendant because his crimi-
nal actions do not merit the death penalty. See Beck, 447 U.S. at 642-43.
46. Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 243 (1990).
47. Id. at 2494 (plurality opinion). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy joined Justice Souter to form the plurality opinion. Justice Scalia issued a concur-
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upon one of the alternative theories.48 Writing for the plurality, Justice Sou-
ter stated that due process did not require the jury to agree on a theory of
conviction based either upon felony murder or premeditated murder. 4' Ac-
cordingly, the Court held that the jury must only unanimously agree that the
defendant committed first-degree murder.50 As such, the plurality consid-
ered the theories to be alternative means to prove the mens rea necessary for
first-degree murder.5 Justice Souter reasoned that since due process does
not require the jury to agree upon one particular actus reus, the law should
not require it to select unanimously one mens rea.52 Moreover, Justice Sou-
ter recognized that the Court has an obligation to defer to the states on
issues of statutory construction, provided that the statute is constitutional.
53
Finally, the plurality acknowledged that in trials for capital crimes, due pro-
cess requires the judge to instruct the jury on at least one lesser included
offense carrying a non-capital sentence.54 However, Justice Souter found
that if a statute offers alternative theories, the judge may satisfy this due
process requirement by instructing the jury on a lesser included offense of
only one theory of first-degree murder.55
rence, and Justice White led the dissent, accompanied by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens. Id.; see infra note 54.
48. Id. at 2494-95. The Court has held, however, that a charge may not join separate
offenses. See United States v. UCO Oil Co., 546 F.2d 833, 835 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that if
a count joins two or more separate and distinct offenses, it is "duplicitous"), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 966 (1977). Furthermore, statutes that group radically different crimes as alternatives
under one statute violate due process. For example, a jury may not convict a defendant of a
crime based on a statute that offers the alternatives of embezzling, reckless driving, tax evasion,
littering, or burglary; these crimes do not contain similar elements. See Schad, I11 S. Ct. at
2497-98.
49. Schad, 111 S. Ct at 2501-04. Instead, premeditated murder and felony murder satisfy
the mens rea element of the offense; they are not separate elements of the crime. Id. at 2500.
50. Id. at 2496-97.
51. Id. at 2497.
52. See id.; see also United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that
the jury does not have to agree upon the specific actus reus).
53. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2500-01. Justice Souter emphasized the Court's obligation to
defer to each state legislature's statutory construction out of respect for the longevity of the
first-degree murder statutes and their frequent usage. Id. at 2501. Only when states pass laws
that transgress constitutional limits may the Court call a statute defining the elements of a
criminal offense into question. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).
54. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2504. With regard to this second issue, Justice Scalia agreed with
Justice Souter's analysis, casting the fifth vote to create a majority opinion. Id. at 2507; see
supra note 45.
55. Justice Souter announced that due process does not require the judge to instruct the
jury on a lesser included offense for each theory of first-degree murder. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at
2504-05. The Court reasoned that since the judge instructed the jury on second-degree mur-
der, which is a lesser included non-capital offense of premeditated murder, the trial court did
not present the jury with an impermissible "all or nothing choice" of either convicting the
defendant of a death penalty offense or completely acquitting him. Id. As such, due process
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Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion," agreeing that due process
does not require the jury to agree unanimously upon one theory of first-
degree murder." He wrote separately, however, to emphasize that since
first-degree murder statutes such as Arizona's have been the established
norm for over two centuries,58 the Court does not have the authority to
subject their construction to the rigors of a due process review.5 9
In his dissent," Justice White asserted that the plurality decision contra-
dicted Winship's requirement that the prosecutor prove every element of a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.61 As felony murder and premeditated
murder have no common element except for the fact that someone was
killed, Justice White reasoned that the two theories criminalize two different
types of conduct.62 Since the conduct is neither similar in act nor in mental
state, Justice White argued that it defies due process to treat them as inter-
changeable equivalents.6 3 Justice White declared that a general verdict of
did not require the judge to instruct on robbery as a lesser included offense of felony murder.
Id.; see supra note 45. Further analysis of this issue exceeds the scope of this Note.
56. Id. at 2505-07 (Scalia, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 2507. Other than the fact that this statutory construction has been used
throughout history, the plurality's only other argument is that the mens rea necessary for
felony murder and premeditated murder may have the same "moral equivalence," which was
not the petitioner's complaint. Id. Although moral equivalence is necessary, it is only one of
many conditions which must be met. Id. Furthermore, Justice Scalia pointed out that the
plurality omitted the other conditions that must be satisfied for constitutionality. Id.
58. Id. at 2506. The common law had only one crime of murder, a crime for which the
law imposed the death penalty in all cases. See, e.g., id.; FRANCIS WHARTON, LAW OF HOMI-
CIDE 147 (3d ed. 1907); Roy MORELAND, LAW OF HOMICIDE 199 (1952). However, the
nation grew increasingly dissatisfied with this common law construction. See McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183, 198 (1971) (describing the "rebellion" against common law that re-
quired mandatory death for all murderers). In 1794, Pennsylvania led the nation in dividing
the concept of murder into two statutory degrees as follows:
[A]II murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, or by
any other kind of willful, deliberate, or premeditated killing; or which shall be com-
mitted in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, or bur-
glary, shall be deemed murder of the first degree; and all other kinds of murder shall
be deemed murder in the second degree.
Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2506 (quoting 1794 Pa. Laws, ch. 1766, § 2).
59. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2507. "It goes without saying that preventing and dealing with
crime is much more the business of the States than it is of the Federal Government and that we
should not lightly construe the Constitution so as to intrude upon the administration of justice
by the individual States." Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977) (citation omitted).
60. Schad, Ill S.Ct. at 2508 (White, J., dissenting).
61. Justice White asserted that the plurality was incorrect in finding that the statute af-
forded due process. Id.; see text accompanying supra notes 12-19 (discussing the holding in
Winship).
62. Since the murder of Larry Grove, adjustments to the Arizona first-degree murder
statute have further clarified the fact that premeditated murder and felony murder are com-
posed of different elements and mens rea. Id. at 2508-09 & n. 1.
63. Id. at 2508-09. In State v. Smith, 774 P.2d 811, 817 (Ariz. 1989) (en bane), the Ari-
zona Supreme Court acknowledged that lack of disclosure regarding the jury's vote on alterna-
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"'guilty of first-degree murder' "" fails to communicate the crime of which
the defendant was found guilty.6" Justice White concluded that the Arizona
statute violates due process because it deprives the accused of a unanimous
jury verdict.6"
This Note analyzes whether a guilty verdict under the Arizona first-degree
murder statute deprives the accused of due process. This Note examines the
relationship between jury unanimity and the evolution of the reasonable
doubt standard. Next, this Note compares and contrasts the felony murder
doctrine with the premeditated murder doctrine as alternative theories of
first-degree murder and analyzes the judicial trend regarding due process
guarantees of jury unanimity. This Note then reviews the plurality, concur-
ring, and dissenting opinions in Schad v. Arizona and concludes that the
plurality decision in Schad conflicts with the due process requirement of a
unanimous verdict for all state capital cases. Finally, this Note suggests that
the result of Schad will be an erosion of jury unanimity and a devalued right
to due process. The Court's refusal to require a jury to agree upon one of the
two theories of first-degree murder, despite the fact that they are inherently
different crimes, renders a jury's unanimous verdict as to a defendant's guilt
meaningless.
I. JURY UNANIMITY AND THE EVOLUTION OF REASONABLE DOUBT
Dating back to the Middle Ages,67 the jury was used to prevent govern-
ment harassment and unfounded conviction of the innocent.6" Royal inter-
ference with the jury trial in colonial times reinforced the importance of this
tive theories of first-degree murder may introduce doubt into the validity of a general jury
verdict. See infra note 211.
64. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2509.
65. Id. The reality is that the jury may not have unanimously agreed upon one theory of
first-degree murder. See id. In that sense, the jury did not find the defendant guilty of any
specified crime. See text accompanying supra note 193.
66. Id. at 2509-10. This is the same "'guilty of crime'" mentality, Justice White rea-
soned, as a jury verdict that pronounces the accused guilty based on a statute with alternative
theories of reckless driving or embezzlement. Id.; see supra note 48.
67. However, it is unclear when exactly the English jury evolved. See Welsh S. White,
Fact-Finding and the Death Penalty: The Scope of a Capital Defendant's Right to Jury Trial, 65
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 5 (1989) (discussing the development of the role of the jury through-
out the Middle Ages).
68. White, supra note 67, at 3 (discussing the history of trial by jury). In instilling the
practice of a jury trial, the Framers intended to protect the accused from dishonest prosecutors
and unfair judges. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). The Framers sought to
counter the imbalance of power between the government and an accused by requiring the
community to participate in the judicial process. White, supra note 67, at 3. However, the
Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee a defendant the right to a unanimous jury verdict
for all state criminal cases. See supra note 6.
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concept in American criminal law.69 The crucial feature of a jury is the
power of an ordinary group of laymen to act as a buffer betweeen an accused
and his accusers.7 ° The prosecution must overcome the burden of proving a
defendant's guilt not only to the judge, but to a group of the defendant's
peers.7
Although the Constitution requires jury unanimity for death penalty
cases, the United States Supreme Court has rarely issued guidelines setting
forth the exact facts upon which the jury must unanimously agree.72 How-
ever, the Court held in Winship 73 that the Due Process Clause guarantees
each criminal defendant the right to a jury verdict on all "facts" that are
elements of the offense.74 The Court further required the prosecutor to
prove each such fact beyond a reasonable doubt.75 As with jury unanimity,
the Court created the reasonable doubt standard to prevent potential abuse
and the possibility of erroneous conviction.76 The Court held that due pro-
cess requires the prosecutor to prove every fact of an alleged crime beyond a
reasonable doubt before a jury may convict a criminal defendant.77
69. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 3, § 21.1.
70. Id. § 21.1(e).
71. Thus, the jury provides the defendant with additional protection against random ag-
gression by overzealous prosecutors. White, supra note 67, at 3 n.21 (quoting Duncan, 391
U.S. at 156); see supra note 68.
72. Thus, the Court has only been specific in its requirement of unanimity. See White,
supra note 67, at 14-21. Like the concept of the jury, the requirement of jury unanimity arose
in England, as did the practice of a twelve-person jury. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404,
407-08 & n.2 (1972).
73. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
74. See id. at 364. The Court had thus begun to describe the facts upon which the jury
must agree. See id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 363-64. The Court referred to the reasonable doubt standard as "a prime in-
strument" to protect the presumption of innocence which is the bedrock of our criminal justice
system. Id.; see supra notes 68, 78. Moreover, the requirement of unanimity implements the
reasonable doubt standard. Note, Right to Jury Unanimity on Material Fact Issues: United
States v. Gipson, 91 HARV. L. REv. 499, 501 n.19 (1977); United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d
453, 457 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1977).
77. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364. There should be no reasonable doubt in the minds of the
jurors that an innocent man was charged with the crime. Id.
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Although some courts have attempted to define the concept of reasonable
doubt,78 others have assumed that the words speak for themselves. 79 The
Winship requirement that the jury reach a "'subjective state of certitude of
the facts in issue' " before announcing a verdict reduces the danger of a jury
mistakenly finding an innocent man guilty.8 ° Winship predicted that as a
result of the extensive deliberations required of the jury, the public would
have increased confidence in the convictions delivered by unanimous ju-
ries." Winship asserted that if the standard of proof were lower than rea-
sonable doubt, it would dilute the strength of the criminal justice system.8 2
Following Winship, the Supreme Court qualified the specific "facts" that
the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to a unanimous jury in
state death penalty cases.8 3 In Mullaney v. Wilbur,"4 the Court considered
the constitutionality of Maine's murder statute,85 which presumed malice
aforethought.8 6 The statute placed the burden on the defendant to rebut this
78. See LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 16, § 1.8(0. The most well-known attempt to de-
fine reasonable doubt was undertaken by Chief Justice Shaw when he gave the following jury
instructions:
[R]easonable doubt.., is a term often used, probably pretty well understood, but not
easily defined. It is not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human
affairs, and depending on moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary
doubt. It is that state of the case, which, after the entire comparison and considera-
tion of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they
cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the
charge.
Id. § 1.8(0 (quoting Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 320 (1850), overruled
on other grounds by Commonwealth v. McLeod, 326 N.E.2d 905 (Mass. 1975)).
79. See, e.g., Miles v. U.S., 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1881) (stating that "[a]ttempts to explain
the term 'reasonable doubt' do not usually result in making it any clearer to the minds of the
jury"); State v. Sauer, 38 N.W. 355, 356 (Minn. 1888) (stating that "[t]he term 'reasonable
doubt' is almost incapable of any definition which will add much to what the words themselves
imply"). See generally 9 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2497 (Chadbourn rev. 1981); Mc-
CORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 341 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984 & Supp. 1987); J.P.
MCBAINE, Burden of Proof- Degrees of Belief, 32 CAL. L. REV. 242, 264-68 (1944) (offering
various jury instructions on proof beyond a reasonable doubt). Even the Model Penal Code
refuses to define "reasonable doubt" because the term is best left to explain itself. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 1.12 Cmt. 2, at 190 (1985).
80. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (quoting Norman Dorsen & Daniel A.
Rezneck, In re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1 FAM. LAW Q. 1, 26 (1967)).
81. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
82. The possibility that a jury might convict an innocent man would rise because the jury
could attain unanimity based on a lower standard of proof. See id.
83. See State v. Parker, 592 A.2d 228, 231 (N.J. 1991) (citing to Schad v. Arizona, 111 S.
Ct. 2491, 2497 (1991) for the proposition that the definition of "fact" is unclear even when jury
unanimity is unquestionably required); White, supra note 67, at 15.
84. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
85. See id. at 691-92.
86. "Malice aforethought" is also known as "malice prepense," which is an intention to
kill or seriously injure, knowledge that an act or failure to act would cause death or serious
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presumption by raising the defense of provocation or heat of passion.87 The
Court found that the statute violated the due process requirement of Win-
ship because it forced the defendant affirmatively to prove provocation.
88
The Court reasoned that because provocation directly relates to the statu-
tory element of malice, the prosecutor must prove that element beyond a
reasonable doubt.8 9 The Mullaney Court thus ruled that the states cannot
shift the burden of proof to the defendant on any element of a crime.90
The Court limited Mullaney in Patterson v. New York, 9 holding that a
New York murder statute requiring a defendant to prove the affirmative de-
fense of extreme emotional disturbance did not unfairly shift the burden of
proof to the defendant. 92 Since malice was not an element of the crime of
first-degree murder, the fact that the statute required the defendant to raise
the defense of extreme emotional disturbance did not offend due process. 93
If a statute does not specify a "fact" as an element of a crime, it may shift the
burden of raising and proving that fact to the defendant.94 Thus, despite
bodily injury, or intent to commit a felony or resist lawful arrest. See Schad, 111 S. Ct. at
2506.
87. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 703. The heat of passion or provocation defense removes the
presumption of malice aforethought and reduces murder to manslaughter. See id. at 686-87;
White, supra note 67, at 15-16.
88. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 703-04.
89. Id. at 702. See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 32-36 (1969) (rejecting a statute
that requires a possessor of marijuana to prove that it was not illegally imported); Tot v.
United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943) (discussing the evils of presuming a defendant's guilt
of an offense based on a fact that is not relevant to the defendant's guilt).
90. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 703-04. See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Limitation of Sub-
stantive Criminal Law.: An Examination of the Meaning of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 55 B.U. L.
REV. 775, 776 (1975) (interpreting Mullaney as asserting that due process limits the legisla-
tures' ability to draft crimes as they please); see generally In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970) (asserting that the government bears the burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt to the jury).
91. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
92. Id. at 206-07, 216. Patterson shot and killed his estranged wife after observing her in
a "state of semiundress" with a former lover. Id. at 198. The effect of this affirmative defense,
if accepted by the jury, would be to reduce the severity of the offense from second-degree
murder to manslaughter. See id. at 198-99. But see Mark R. Adams, Case Comment, Affirm-
ative Criminal Defenses-The Reasonable Doubt Rule in the Aftermath of Patterson vs. New
York, 39 OHIo ST. L.J. 393, 413 (1978) (asserting that the Patterson decision does not protect
an accused from an erroneous conviction because innocence is not presumed); Celia Goldwag,
Note, The Constitutionality of Affirmative Defenses After Patterson v. New York, 78 COLUM.
L. REV. 655, 656 (1978) (arguing that Patterson does not rationally prove the constitutionality
of affirmative defenses).
93. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 198, 215-16.
94. Id. at 201. The New York homicide statute did not unfairly shift the burden of proof
to defendants because the New York homicide statute did not employ the concept of malice.
Id. at 198, 215-16. The Court held that it was not unconstitutional to require the defendant to
prove extreme emotional disturbance as an affirmative defense. Thus, the defendant has a
right to jury trial on facts which the statute specifies as elements of the offense. Constitutional
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Mullaney, the Court reiterated that a defendant's due process right to a
unanimous jury determination in state capital cases extends only to those
facts that the state statute specifies as essential elements of an offense.95
Until recently, the Supreme Court had not determined which facts the
prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt when the statute offers an
option of different acts sufficient for the actus reus of a crime.9 6 In United
States v. Gipson , the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
confronted the due process requirements of such a situation.98 In Gipson,
the federal prosecutors charged the defendant under a federal statute that
grouped six acts under the umbrella of one crime: "storing, receiving, selling,
bartering, concealing, or disposing" of a vehicle into interstate commerce
when that vehicle is known to be stolen. 99 The trial judge instructed the jury
limits, however, do preclude a guilt presumption based merely on identification of the accused
or an indictment. See White, supra note 67, at 16-17 & n.133.
95. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 215. See White, supra note 67, at 16-17; Ronald J. Allen, The
Restoration of In re Winship: A Comment on Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases After
Patterson v. New York, 76 MICH. L. REV. 30, 37 (1977) (arguing that Patterson resurrected
the true meaning of Winship after Mullaney incorrectly stretched it beyond its holding); Ste-
phen D. Brandt, Comment, Affirmative Defenses in Ohio After Mullaney v. Wilbur, 36 OHIO
ST. L.J. 828, 859 (1975) (advocating that sanity is an element of every crime, which the prose-
cutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, not an affirmative defense to be borne by a
defendant).
However, the defendant does not have a right to a jury trial on capital sentencing, only the
verdict of guilt or innocence. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 465 (1984). In Spaziano, the
Court held that the judge, in addition to the jury, can properly assess the individual circum-
stance of each defendant and deliver a death sentence. Prevailing Florida law allowed the jury
to recommend a penalty which the judge was not required to implement. Id. at 451. On
appeal from the Florida Supreme Court, the Court distinguished between the guilt and the
sentencing phases, declaring the law constitutional. Id. at 457-59. See White, supra note 67,
at 17-18.
The Court has also ruled that the state can require the defendant to prove self-defense,
provided that it is not an element of the offense and that the prosecutor proves all elements of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 236 (1987). Applying
the same logic, the Constitution does not require the prosecution to prove the sanity of a
defendant who claims that he is not guilty because of insanity. Id. However, the presumption
of criminal intent violates Winship's requirement that the prosecutor prove all elements of a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt if intent is an element of the crime. Francis v. Franklin, 471
U.S. 307, 318 (1985).
96. Statutes that can be violated by several distinct acts such that the jury must only agree
that the defendant is guilty of illegal activity have been termed "patchwork" verdicts. Note,
supra note 76, at 499. Until the first federal court addressed patchwork verdicts in United
States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977), the majority of state courts held that these
patchwork verdicts were constitutional because a defendant does not have right to a unani-
mous jury verdict for state criminal cases. Id. at 499 & n. 1; see supra note 6. The Court did,
however, address that issue in Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491 (1991). See infra part liA &
note 195.
97. 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977).
98. Id. at 456-57.
99. See 18 U.S.C. § 2313 (1988).
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that due process did not require the jury to agree unanimously upon which
specific act was committed. 10
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court decision, holding that in addi-
tion to agreeing unanimously upon the accused's guilt of the crime, due pro-
cess also requires "substantial agreement" among the jurors as to the
defendant's specific course of action that constitutes the actus reus of the
crime. 10' The court held that since the actus reus is an element of the crime,
acts organized under a "grouping" must have sufficient similarities in order
to meet the due process requirement articulated in Winship that the prosecu-
tor prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 102 If a court
finds that the acts within a statutory grouping are not sufficiently similar, the
statute violates due process because the prosecutor is unable to prove the
actus reus element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 10 3 In Gipson, the
statute should have divided the six acts into two "distinct conceptual group-
ings"' of similar acts, requiring the jury to attain unanimity within each
grouping.'0 5 However, the Fifth Circuit did not require the jury to agree
unanimously upon material facts if the statute did not explicitly delineate
them as elements of the crime.
0 6
II. THEORIES IN CONFLICT: FELONY MURDER AND
PREMEDITATED MURDER
When the felony murder doctrine originally developed at common law,
long before Winship required the prosecutor to prove every element of a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt, every felony was punishable by death.
0 7
100. Gipson, 553 F.2d at 455-56.
101. Id. at 457-58.
102. Id. at 458. See generally In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
103. Gipson, 553 F.2d at 453. The Court found that the jury in the trial below did not
achieve a unanimous verdict as the Due Process Clause requires. Id.
104. Id. The first grouping would be "housing" which includes receiving, concealing, and
storing stolen vehicles; the second would be "marketing" which encompasses bartering, sell-
ing, and disposing of stolen vehicles. Id. Thus, each grouping contains acts that are inherently
different from the acts within the other grouping. Id.
105. Id. See Sally Wellman, Note, Jury Instructions and the Unanimous Jury Verdict, 1978
Wis. L. REV. 339, 349 (asserting that Gipson does not overburden the prosecutor as it only
requires him to prove the offense charged).
106. Note, supra note 76, at 505 (arguing that the Gipson decision ensures that the jury
attained a meaningful unanimity on the criminal acts committed by the defendant). However,
it has yet to be determined what constitutes a material fact. Id. at 502 n.26. Although the
Sixth Amendment requires the jury to agree upon a fact if it is material before conviction, the
jury need only agree upon those material facts. Id.
107. Roth & Sundby, supra note 27, at 450. In contrast, in modem times, the Court has
held that the death penalty for a crime as severe as rape constitutes a "cruel and unusual
punishment" under the Eighth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend VIII; see supra note 5. See,
e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599 (1977) (stating that the death penalty is an excessive
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Since all felonies were punished alike, the doctrine had very little practical
effect. 08 It made no difference whether the accused was hanged for the un-
derlying felony or the resulting murder. " The due process principle estab-
lished in Winship reflected the desire of the Court to restrict the harshness of
this common law doctrine." ° Since most felonies are now punishable by
lesser penalties than those for first-degree murder, the need for a limitation
on the felony murder doctrine arose."'1
The common limitation imposed by states upon the doctrine of felony
murder is that the statute enumerate the underlying felonies that are inher-
ently dangerous to human life." 2 Other states have limited the scope of the
doctrine to common law felonies." 13 In addition, jurisdictions have nar-
punishment for the rape of an adult woman if the rape did not take human life); Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910) (stating that the Eighth Amendment requires that the
punishment for a crime be proportional to the offense committed).
108. LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 16, § 7.5(a) n.4. See Powers v. Commonwealth, 61
S.W. 735, 741 (Ky. 1901) (advocating limitations upon the common law felony murder doc-
trine because society has grown more selective in administering the death penalty).
109. LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 16, § 7.5(a) n.4.
110. Id. at 621. The three states of Hawaii, Kentucky, and Michigan have abolished this
law outright, either by statute or by judicial order. See HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 707-701 (1988);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d
304, 321-22 (Mich. 1980) (reasoning that since the judiciary created the felony murder doc-
trine, it can also abrogate it); see also Tamu Sudduth, Comment, The Dillon Dilemma: Finding
Proportionate Felony-Murder Punishments, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1307 (1984) (discussing the
growing dissatisfaction with the felony murder rule). Ohio has a felony-involuntary man-
slaughter rule, rather than felony murder. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.04 (Baldwin 1982).
111. See generally Powers v. Commonwealth, 61 S.W. 735, 741-42 (Ky. 1901) (holding
that when a common law felony is reduced to a misdemeanor, an unlawful killing in the perpe-
tration of that crime is manslaughter, not murder); State v. Harrison, 564 P.2d 1321, 1324
(N.M. 1977) (referring to the felony murder rule as "legal fiction"); LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra
note 16, at 623-25; H.L. Packer, Criminal Code Revision, 23 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 4 (1973)
(characterizing the felony murder rule as "an unsightly wart on the skin of the criminal law").
112. Eg., People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 133 (Cal. 1965) (requiring that the felon
must kill in the perpetration of an inherently dangerous felony for the felony murder doctrine
to apply); People v. Pavlic, 199 N.W. 373, 374 (Mich. 1924) (finding that although the sale of
liquor was a felony, it was "not in itself directly and naturally dangerous to life"). The Eng-
lish, the creators of this controversial rule, chose to abandon it as a legal concept in 1957. See
Roth & Sundby, supra note 27, at 448 n.12.
The Model Penal Code does not adopt the felony murder doctrine per se but states that a
defendant has committed murder when the killing was performed recklessly. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 210.2 (1980). Recklessness is presumed if: "the actor is engaged or is an accomplice in
the commission of ... robbery, rape, or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force,
arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape." Id. § 210.2(1)(b); see Herbert Wechsler,
Codification of Criminal Law in the United States.: The Model Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV.
1425, 1446 (1968) (discussing the classifications of homicide).
113. See also Commonwealth v. Exler, 89 A. 968, 969-70 (Pa. 1914) (stating that since
statutory rape is not a common law felony, death from shock of statutory rape is not murder);
LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 16, § 7.5(b) (explaining that common law felonies are usually
rape, sodomy, burglary, arson, mayhem, and larceny).
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rowly construed the common law requirement that the killing take place "in
the commission of a felony" by limiting the time that may elapse between
the homicide and the commission of the felony. 1 4 A more stringent causal
connection between the felony and the death presents yet a further limitation
to the scope of the doctrine." 5
Although felony murder and premeditated murder can both lead to the
same conviction of first-degree murder, the courts treat convictions on each
theory differently for sentencing purposes." 6 Only a small minority of states
allows the imposition of the death penalty for felony murder." 7 In those
particular jurisdictions, the prosecutor must prove that additional aggravat-
ing circumstances outweigh any mitigating factors before a defendant may
be considered for the death penalty."' Juries have shown a reluctance to
sentence a defendant to death based solely on accomplice liability in felony
murders. 1 9
The Supreme Court also treats felony murder and premeditated murder
differently for sentencing purposes. In Enmund v. Florida,2 ° the Court re-
quired that in a felony murder case, a defendant individually harbor an in-
tent to kill as a prerequisite for the death penalty. 12 ' Although involved in
the robbery that instigated the killings, the defendant in Enmund did not
himself kill, was not present when the victims were killed, and did not even
114. The time of the killing is when the fatal blow was struck, not when the victim died.
LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 16, § 7.5(0(1) n.84. The time of killing is only one factor that
must be considered along with causation. Id. § 7.5(0(1)-(2).
115. Id.
116. In the 1970s, the Supreme Court invalidated state death penalty statutes that led to
either mandatory or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty after conviction. See Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972); Gregory M. Stein, Note, Distinguishing Among Murders
When Assessing the Proportionality of the Death Penalty, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1786 (1985)
(asserting that the constitutionalty of the death penalty should be considered separately for
each type of capital murder).
117. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 794-95 (1982) (noting that "[tjhe evidence is over-
whelming that American juries have repudiated imposition of the death penalty for crimes
such as [felony murder]"). The Court found that only 8 to 17 jurisdictions would allow the
death penalty for a defendant who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill, but was a
major participant in an armed robbery that resulted in the deaths of two people. Stein, supra
note 116, at 1796-97; see Enmund, 458 U.S. at 789-90; see also text accompanying infra notes
120-28.
118. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 791. The Court has recognized that first-degree murder with an
aggravating circumstance present is a more serious crime than other first-degree murders, and
that some murders may be sufficiently heinous to support an automatic death sentence. Stein,
supra note 116, at 1801.
119. The Court noted that juries have overwhelmingly rejected the death penalty for En-
mund-type felony murders. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 794. See Stein, supra note 116, at 1797.
120. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
121. Id. at 801. See Nancy A. McKerrow, Note, Mens Rea as an Element Necessary for
Capital Punishment: Enmund v. Florida, 48 Mo. L. REV. 1063, 1071 (1983) (endorsing the
Enmund decision because it established intent as a factor in death penalty decisions).
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intend that the victims be killed. 122 However, the defendant did commit the
felony of robbery. 123 Because two people were killed in the course of that
robbery, the jury also found him guilty of first-degree murder.' 24 Since he
was only an accomplice and not the actual "triggerman," however, the
Supreme Court declared that he was ineligible for the death penalty. 125 The
Court ruled that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth
Amendment 126 bars the death penalty in the context of felony murder, un-
less the defendant actually killed, attempted to kill, or otherwise intended to
aid or contribute to the murder.' 27 Thus, the Court recognized that the
Constitution requires the distribution of punishments based upon personal
culpability, responsibility, and guilt, rather than punishment based on a gen-
eralized criminal charge.
128
In Tison v. Arizona, 129 another felony murder case based on robbery, the
Supreme Court modified the restrictions of Enmund. 3° The petitioners in
Tison helped their father and his fellow inmate to escape from prison, armed
and aided the two convicts in robbing a family of four, and then watched
them murder the entire family.' Although the defendants did not possess
an actual intent to kill,'3 2 the Court found that they were major participants
in the prison escape and did not attempt to separate themselves from the
murders."' 3 The Court reasoned that the mental state of reckless indiffer-
ence to human life rose to the level of culpability deserving of the death
penalty. ' 3 4 Notwithstanding Enmund, in order to qualify for the death pen-
alty based on felony murder, a defendant does not specifically have to intend
to kill. 135 The Eighth Amendment allows the death penalty for felony mur-
der if the defendant merely exhibits a reckless indifference to human life.
136
In contrast, premeditated murder requires a specific intent to kill.
137
122. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788.
123. Id. at 785.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 797.
126. For the text of the Eighth Amendment, see supra note 5.
127. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797.
128. Id. The unique nature of the death penalty requires a court to give each death penalty
candidate individualized consideration. See Stein supra note 116, at 1789; MODEL PENAL
CODE § 210.6 (detailing sentencing provisions for the death penalty according to aggravating
and mitigating factors).
129. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
130. Id. at 137.
131. Id. at 139-41.
132. Id. at 137.
133. Id.






Despite the dissimilarities between premeditated murder and felony mur-
der in mens rea, actus reus, and sentencing provisions, the majority of states
have long treated felony murder and premeditated murder as alternative the-
ories of one crime, first-degree murder. 3 In Schad v. Arizona, the Supreme
Court confronted Arizona's first-degree murder statute, which, like numer-
ous other states, combined the theories of felony murder and premeditated
murder under one statute as the single crime of first-degree murder.
1 39
III. SCHAD v. ARIZONA: DUE PROCESS OF ALTERNATIVE
MURDER THEORIES
In Schad, the issue was whether the Arizona first-degree murder statute
treating first-degree murder as a single crime denied due process."4° While
the plurality held that due process allows the statute to group felony murder
and premeditated murder together as a single crime,"' the dissent con-
tended that due process requires state legislatures to treat each theory as a
separate offense. 42 The source of the disagreement lay in determining the
point at which the state must treat alternative theories of a crime as separate
offenses because of their inherent disparity.143
A. The Plurality: A Single Mens Rea
In writing the plurality opinion, Justice Souter questioned whether pre-
meditated murder and felony murder are such inherently separate crimes
that the Arizona legislature went beyond the acceptable limits of defining
criminal conduct by grouping them together as one crime."' The plurality
held that the grouping of the two types of murder under one statute did not
violate due process. 45 Justice Souter reasoned that premeditated murder
and felony murder are merely alternative means of proving the mens rea
necessary to convict a defendant of first-degree murder.' 46 Justice Souter
declared that the jury must unanimously decide whether the accused com-
138. Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491, 2502 (1991).
139. Id. at 2496.
140. Id. at 2493.
141. Id. at 2504.
142. Id. at 2511 (White, J., dissenting). There is an additional argument that the felony
murder should be abandoned altogether. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 16, § 7.6(h); Roth
& Sundby, supra note 27, at 446 (discussing the abundant criticisms of the felony murder
doctrine as a legal principle).
143. Id. at 2496 (plurality opinion).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2504.
146. See id.; State v. Encinas, 647 P.2d 624, 627 (Ariz. 1982) (holding that since the judge
instructed the jury on felony murder and premeditated murder which are one crime, the
charge was not duplicitous); State v. Axley, 646 P.2d 268, 277 (Ariz. 1982) (asserting that each
offense must be charged in a separate count).
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mitted the crime of first-degree murder, 47 not whether the prosecutor
proved each element of that crime. 14 Moreover, Justice Souter stated that
the jury was not required to agree upon either the defendant's specific act or
mental state at the time of the offense.'
49
The plurality in Schad contended that the jury reached a unanimous ver-
dict under Arizona's first-degree murder statute.' 50 Justice Souter framed
the issue as one not of jury unanimity regarding the mens rea of the crime,
but of the constitutionality of the statute itself.' 5' He reasoned that since
due process does not require an indictment to specify one particular act"s2 or
acts incident to commission,- 3 the jury should not have to agree upon a
specific mens rea element of the crime.' 4 Furthermore, the jury does not
have to agree upon preliminary factual issues leading to the verdict.' Ac-
cordingly, due process also should require the jury to specify its finding of
mens rea among statutory alternatives.'
5 6
147. See Schad, I11 S. Ct. at 2504; State v. Counterman, 448 P.2d 96, 101-02 (Ariz. 1968)
(holding that although the defendant is entitled to a unanimous verdict as to whether a crimi-
nal act occurred, he is not also entitled to a unanimous verdict on the precise manner in which
it was committed).
148. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2497.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2496.
151. Id. The plurality disagreed with the petitioner's argument that the Arizona statute
denied his constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict as guaranteed by the Sixth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments for all state capital cases. Id.
152. Id.; see Borum v. United States, 284 U.S. 596 (1932) (allowing the conviction of three
co-defendants for murder although the count did not specifically allege that any one of the co-
defendants physically committed the murder); Andersen v. United States, 170 U.S. 481, 500
(1898) (holding that it was immaterial whether death occurred by drowning or shooting as
alleged in the indictment); St. Clair v. United States, 154 U.S. 134, 145 (1894) (stating that
since the alleged assault could have been committed by one or more of the defendants, the
indictment need not specify one defendant as the alleged perpetrator of the crime). Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c)(1) codified this principle, providing that "[i]t may be alleged
in a single count that the means by which the defendant committed the offense are unknown or
that the defendant committed it by one or more specified means." FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1).
153. Schad, III S. Ct. at 2496-97; FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1); see McKoy v. North Caro-
lina, 494 U.S. 433, 449 (1990) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that "different jurors may be
persuaded by different pieces of evidence, even when they agree upon the bottom line").
154. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2497.
155. Id.
156. See id. at 2496-97; State v. Serna, 211 P.2d 455, 459 (Ariz. 1949) (stating that Arizona
law considers robbery to be "the legal equivalent of ... deliberation, premeditation, and de-
sign"), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 973 (1950); see, e.g., Rollin M. Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea,
52 HARV. L. REV. 905, 926 (1939) (noting that an intentional killing is not murder if suffi-
ciently provoked, while an unintentional and even accidental killing may be murder if the
death occurs during the course of a felony); Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale
of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 701, 702-703 (1937) (discussing conceptual
problems with the mens rea for felony murder which arose at English common law and spread
to the United States).
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The Court conceded that due process limits the ability of a state to offer
alternative courses of conduct as a means to establish the commission of an
offense."" Justice Souter noted that the statute must not be so overly broad
or vague that a reasonably intelligent defendant would not understand the
legal charges filed against him.' Justice Souter further asserted that the
state has the power to punish a defendant only for specific illegal conduct.' 59
Justice Souter explained that if "material differences" exist between statu-
tory alternatives, due process requires state legislatures to treat them as sepa-
rate offenses in order to prevent a generic jury verdict."e°
Although the Court admitted that it had yet to define a "material differ-
ence," the Court did assess Gipson,6' in which the Fifth Circuit introduced
the "distinct conceptual groupings" test. 62 The Court rejected the Gipson
standard of materiality as too amorphous and impracticable for consistent
application. Thus, the plurality left "material difference" undefined. 63 The
Court abstained from issuing new guidelines that would avoid such inappro-
priate groupings and require the jury to attain the proper level of verdict
specificity." Regardless of application problems, Justice Souter charged
that the dissent would also reject Gipson's standard of materiality because it
157. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2496-97.
158. Id.; see Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) (holding that "[a]ll are
entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids"); Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (holding that fair play requires that a new offense explic-
itly inform those subject to it of liability and penalties); United States v. UCO Oil Co., 546
F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that separate offenses cannot be joined under one charge),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977).
159. See Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2497; Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958) (quoting
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), overruled on other grounds by Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), in holding that a state may regulate procedures" 'unless in so doing
it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental' ").
In United States v. Jones, the court held that a defendant could not be convicted for posses-
sion of cocaine with intent to distribute when the defendant only possessed drug preparation
equipment. The court relied upon Schad for the proposition that a defendant may not suffer
criminal punishment unless the government has proven specific illegal conduct. United States
v. Jones, 945 F.2d 747, 749 (4th Cir. 1991).
160. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2497-98.
161. 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977).
162. Id. at 458.
163. See Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2498-99; Manson v. State, 304 N.W.2d 729, 741 (Wis. 1981)
(Abrahamson, J., concurring) (suggesting that one could feasibly put all six acts in one group
as "trafficking in stolen vehicles"); see, e.g., Rice v. State, 532 A.2d 1357, 1365 (Md. 1987)
(declaring that the Gipson test lacks specificity); Hayden J. Trubitt, Patchwork Verdicts, Differ-
ent-Jurors Verdicts, and American Jury Theory: Whether Verdicts Are Invalidated by Juror
Disagreement on Issues, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 473, 548-49 (1983) (putting forth the same
criticisms).
164. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2499.
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involved statutory alternatives that the law did not treat as individual
crimes. "'
Next, Justice Souter stressed the Court's obligation to defer to a state
court's interpretation of its own criminal statute, provided that the interpre-
tation is constitutional. 66 Justice Souter noted that the Arizona Supreme
Court had already presumptively ruled that the statutory option of either
theory of premeditated or felony murder did not unconstitutionally group
two separate crimes under one statute. 167 Instead, the statutory alternatives
determined only the single element of mens rea. 168 The plurality stated that
the Court's only role in shaping Arizona's murder statute was to determine
whether it was "fundamentally fair" and rational under the Due Process
Clause. 169 History and widespread practice, argued the plurality, guide the
Court in determining what is fundamentally fair.'7°
In exercising judicial restraint, the Court noted that it traditionally defers
to the states on the interpretation of their criminal statutes and allows them
to exclude certain facts necessary to prove a crime from the stringent stan-
dard of reasonable doubt.17 ' Out of respect for state legislatures, Justice
165. Id.
166. Id.; see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 690-91 (1975) (holding that "state
courts are the ultimate expositors of state law"); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510
(1948) (noting that when a state court interprets and "cure[s]" an allegedly vague statute, the
Court will uphold that interpreted meaning); Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277 (1915)
(upholding the state's interpretation of a statute as not unconstitutionally vague); United
States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407-08 (1909) (holding that courts should
interpret statutes to avoid constitutional questions).
167. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2499-500.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2500; see, e.g., Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352-53 (1990) (noting
that the Due Process Clause has limited application beyond the Bill of Rights); United States
v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977) (discussing whether nonconstitutional methods such as
the Federal Rules of Evidence should be applied to evaluate evidence or whether to evaluate
such evidence according to basic justice); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952) (ex-
plaining that judges cannot go beyond their judicial scope and implement their own version of
fairness), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103,
112 (1935) (advocating that judges must evaluate matters for basic justice).
In interpreting the Due Process Clause, the Court has applied 3 theories: (1) total incorpora-
tion in which due process incorporates all of the Bill of Rights to the states, (2) fundamental
fairness in which the Court protects all rights that are " 'so rooted in the traditions and con-
science of our people as to be ranked fundamental,'" and (3) selective incorporation which
emphasizes the fundamental nature of due process as a whole, not one requirement. See
LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 3, §§ 2.2-2.5. Since the 1960s, the Court has favored the selec-
tive incorporation doctrine, although the Court applied a fundamental fairness analysis in
Schad. See Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2500; supra note 2.
170. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2500.
171. See id. at 2500-01; Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (discussing self-defense as an
affirmative defense); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (discussing whether the
state can introduce evidence of possession of a firearm in the sentencing phase, rather than as
an element of the offense which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt); Pat-
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Souter stressed that the Court must avoid "second-guessing" a state's inter-
pretation of its statute.172
Applying deference to long-standing statutory construction, Justice Souter
and the plurality found that the Arizona legislature did not abuse its discre-
tion in defining the mens rea for first-degree murder as an option between
premeditated murder and felony murder.1 73 Continuing the English com-
mon law tradition which treated both premeditated and felony murder as
having "'malice aforethought,'" the Court noted that most American juris-
dictions also group the alternative means together to satisfy the mens rea
element. 174 Justice Souter conceded that although not every jurisdiction ac-
cepts this principle, a large number of state courts have ruled as the Court
did in Schad, finding that due process does not require the jury to decide
unanimously whether its theory of first-degree murder was premeditated
murder or felony murder.
175
Justice Souter contended that the issue in Schad was whether felony mur-
der and premeditated murder could ever be morally equal, not whether they
must always be so. 176 Based upon Tison,177 Justice Souter contended that
some individuals could hypothetically find such equivalence between the two
theories of first-degree murder.1 78 Furthermore, the plurality explained that
although it prefers greater specificity in a jury verdict, the Court may only
pass judgment on the constitutionality of a given statute.
179
Justice Scalia concurred in the Court's opinion, agreeing that due process
does not require the jury to agree unanimously upon premeditated murder
or felony murder as a first-degree murder theory. 180 Justice Scalia, however,
wrote a separate opinion to emphasize his belief that traditional statutes can-
not defy due process because they define the concept. I8 1 Justice Scalia also
expressly stated that the Court only has the power to review deviant proce-
terson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 207-09 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701
(1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
172. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2501. "Decisions about what facts are material and what are
immaterial . . . represent value choices more appropriately made in the first instance by a
legislature than by a court. Respect for legislative competence counsels against judicial second
guessing ..... Id. at 2500. Cf Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981). Past usage is not
per se controlling. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2503.
173. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2501.
174. Id.; see JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
21-22 (New York, Garland 1980) (3d ed. 1883).
175. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2502. For various state cases supporting that proposition, see
supra note 31.
176. Id. at 2503.
177. 481 U.S. 137 (1987); see supra notes 129-37 and accompanying text.
178. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2503.
179. Id. at 2504.
180. Id. at 2506 (Scalia, J., concurring).
181. Id. at 2506-07.
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dures for due process violations, not long accepted practices.' 82 Justice
Scalia declared that the Court's duty is to interpret the Constitution as it
presently exists, not to create a new one.'
83
B. The Dissent: Violation of Jury Unanimity
Justice White, writing for the dissent in Schad,'84 asserted that the plural-
ity's holding denies a defendant his due process guarantee that requires the
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime
charged. 5 The Justice criticized the plurality because, although it deferred
the ability to structure the crime to the states, it ignored the fact that, with
the exception than an individual is unlawfully killed, premeditated murder
and felony murder have entirely unrelated elements.' 86 Justice White
reasoned that a first-degree murder conviction based on alternative theories
that contain different elements, results in a hollow jury verdict, albeit
unanimous. 87
Justice White noted that the felony murder doctrine requires a finding
that an accused intended to and did participate in a felony that resulted in
death.'"8 In contrast, premeditated murder requires proof of a defendant's
premeditated intent to kill.' 89 Thus, Justice White concluded that the differ-
ences in conduct between the two theories were so pronounced that due pro-
cess would not allow the mens rea of the one theory to act as the substitute
for the mens rea of the other.'90 Justice White asserted that an intent to rob
is not equivalent to a premeditated intent to kill.' 9 '
As a result of the disparate elements, Justice White noted that in Schad
six members of the jury could have found the accused guilty of first-degree
murder based on felony murder, whereas the other half could have found
him guilty due to premeditation.' 92 The dissent asserted that since felony
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 2507-13.
185. Id. at 2508 (White, J., dissenting) (relying on Winship for the proposition that due
process requires "proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which [the defendant] is charged." 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
186. See Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2508; see supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
187. Id. at 2510.
188. Id. at 2508.
189. Id. at 2509.
190. See id.; State v. Serna, 211 P.2d 455, 459 (Ariz. 1949), cert. denied, Serna v. Walters,
339 U.S. 973 (1950).
191. Schad, IIl S. Ct. at 2509 (implying that the plurality's reasoning in Schad drew this
equation).
192. Id. But see State v. Boots, 780 P.2d 725, 728 (Or. 1989) (en banc) (stating that "of
course jurors cannot convict a defendant if they unanimously agree that he intended to kill a
person but only half believe he did so").
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murder and premeditated murder contain materially different elements, a
unanimous jury verdict may mean nothing more than that the jury agreed
that an unlawful killing occurred. 9 ' Justice White asserted that the Ari-
zona statute and similar state statutes create a "generic verdict," such that
one is only "guilty of crime," not of any specified conduct. 194
Justice White accused the plurality of confusing the Winship requirement
of proof of the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt with the lesser
standard of proof required for the factual details of commission of a
crime.19 5 The Justice criticized the plurality for upholding a statute that did
not require specific proof of premeditation or a felony to sustain a first-de-
gree murder conviction based on premeditated or felony murder. 196 Once a
statute establishes the elements of a crime, the Justice continued, the prose-
cution cannot shirk its duty to prove each of those elements.19 Further-
more, Justice White argued that if a state legislature improperly defines a
statute, due process does not allow the judiciary to rectify the problem
through judicial interpretation.
19 8
After noting that a premeditated murder conviction, in contrast to a con-
viction for felony-murder, requires that the accused be the actual killer and
harbor intent to kill, the dissent pointed out that the unanimous jury verdict
did not specify which of the two alternative theories the jury endorsed. 99
193. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2509 (explaining that the verdict in such a situation fails to dis-
close whether the jury believed that the prosecution proved the two elements of felony murder
or the three elements of premeditated murder beyond a reasonable doubt).
194. Id. at 2510.
195. Id. (distinguishing, for example, that the prosecution must prove the elements of bur-
glary beyond a reasonable doubt, not the factual details of which tool the defendant used to
break and enter). Under this view, the jury is not required to agree upon the basic factual
issues which lead to the verdict. McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 449 (1990) (Black-
mun, J., concurring). See United States v. Horton, 921 F.2d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding
that the jury does not have to agree whether a defendant was the principle or an accomplice),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2860 (1991); United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 67 (2d Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 923 (1985); State v. Smith, 563 A.2d 671, 674 (Conn. 1989)
(same); State v. Johnson, 545 N.E.2d 636, 645 (Ohio 1989) (disallowing a patchwork verdict
because the acts were not conceptually different), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1039 (1990).
196. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2510.
197. See id.; Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 401 (1985) (holding that the Due Process
Clause applies to discretionary state action); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979)
(holding that when a homicide statute requires that a defendant have performed a crime know-
ingly or intentionally, the state cannot shift to the defendant the burden of proving lack of
necessary intent); supra text accompanying notes 83-95.
198. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2511 (explaining that by tolerating such judicial interpretation,
states could "escape federal constitutional scrutiny even when its actions violate rudimentary
due process").
199. See id.; Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (explaining that Enmund is satis-
fied when the defendant was a significant player in the underlying felony and exhibited reckless
indifference to human life); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (prohibiting the
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Despite this lack of disclosure, the sentencing judge in Schad assumed that
Schad committed premeditated murder.2"o Since intent to kill satisfies the
threshold requirement for a death penalty sentence, the judge was able to
sentence the petitioner to death.2"'
Justice White explained, however, that the sentencing judge may have im-
posed the death penalty based upon a theory of premeditated murder even
with no jurors believing that the prosecution had proven premeditation be-
yond a reasonable doubt.2°2 Justice White argued that if the jury had con-
victed Schad because a murder occurred in the midst of a felony, Enmund v.
Florida 203 required proof that the petitioner killed, intended to kill, inflicted
deadly force upon, or attempted to kill the victim before the judge could
deliver a death sentence. 2' Furthermore, under Tison v. Arizona,2 °5 a fel-
ony murderer may receive the death penalty if he played a significant role in
the crime sequence and exhibited a reckless indifference for human life.206
Yet, the jury's general verdict of guilty of first-degree murder offered no hint
of such specific findings. 20 7 Thus, the judge's unfounded presumption of
premeditated murder denied Schad his due process right to the procedural
protections that the Court has developed to accompany death penalty
208sentencing.
IV. JURY UNANIMITY AFTER SCHAD
A. Lack of Jury Unanimity Is Fundamentally Unfair
The issue in Schad v. Arizona 209 was whether a state legislature violates
due process when it offers felony murder and premeditated murder as statu-
imposition of the death penalty unless the defendant killed, attempted to kill, intended that a
killing occur, or used deadly force); text accompanying supra notes 120-37.
200. The sentencing judge announced, " 'The court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant attempted to kill Larry Grove, intended to kill Larry Grove and that defendant
did kill Larry Grove.' " Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2511 (quoting Transcript of Sentencing 8-9 (Aug.
29, 1985)).
201. The sentencing judge explained:
"[T]here is not evidence to indicate that this murder was merely incidental to rob-
bery. The nature of the killing itself belies that .... The victim was strangled to
death by a ligature drawn very tightly about the neck and tied in a double knot. No
other reasonable conclusion can be drawn from the proof in this case, notwithstand-
ing the felony murder instruction."
Id. (quoting Transcript of Sentencing 8-9 (Aug. 29, 1985)).
202. Id.
203. 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982); see supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
204. Id. at 797.
205. 481 U.S. 137 (1987). See supra notes 129-37 and accompanying text.
206. Id. at 158.
207. Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491, 2511 (1991).
208. Id. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2; supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
209. 111 S. Ct. 2491 (1991).
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tory alternatives for a first-degree murder conviction. 21 If a jury must only
agree unanimously that an unlawful killing occurred to convict a defendant
of first-degree murder then the Winship requirement that the prosecution
prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt becomes mean-
ingless. 21 1 The plurality refused to recognize that murder in the midst of a
felony and premeditated murder involve radically different patterns of con-
duct and mental states, each with distinct sentencing considerations.212 In
the plurality opinion, Justice Souter justified the decision in Schad by analo-
gizing to indictments, which also allow multiple allegations and do not re-
quire the jury to agree upon the specific act performed.21 3 However, an
indictment only formally charges a defendant with a crime; it does not de-
prive him of his life. 214 As such, the death penalty holds a unique concern
210. Id. at 2508-09 (White, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 2509. In a similar Arizona case, the state prosecuted on three theories: premed-
itated murder, felony murder based on robbery, and felony murder based on kidnapping. State
v. Smith, 774 P.2d 811, 817 (Ariz. 1989) (emphasizing the seriousness of the death penalty and
the desirability of verdict forms for the jury to indicate its chosen theory of first-degree mur-
der). The Arizona Supreme Court in Smith found fundamental error in that the trial judge did
not instruct on either of the underlying felonies. Id. As a result, the court reversed the peti-
tioner's conviction because the general jury verdict did not specify whether the jury based its
verdict on premeditated murder or felony murder, for which the jury instructions were insuffi-
cient. Id. at 712.
General jury instructions on unanimity are not always sufficient. State v. Parker, 592 A.2d
228, 232 (N.J. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1483 (1992); see United States v. North, 910 F.2d
843 (D.C. Cir.) (refusing Oliver North's request for specific instructions from the trial court
because he was charged under one count with destroying, altering, and removing official docu-
ments), vacated in part and rev'd in part on reh'g, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 2235 (1991); United States v. Echeverry, 719 F.2d 974, 975 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding
that the trial court must issue jury instructions requiring specific unanimity if there is a risk of
jury confusion or if the jurors may split on the acts committed by a defendant); People v.
Melendez, 224 Cal. App. 1420, 1433-34 (1990) (noting the insufficiency of a general unanimity
charge when an act can be proven by relying upon different theories and it is probable that
jurors will not agree upon one theory); supra notes 96-106 and accompanying text. The trial
court must issue jury instructions on specific unanimity if there is a probability of fragmenta-
tion among the jury. North, 910 F.2d at 875.
212. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2510-11. See also Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987)
(declaring that reckless indifference to human life satisfied the mens rea for felony murder and
justifies the imposition of the death penalty if the defendant was a major participant in the
events leading to the murder); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (requiring intent
to kill as a prerequisite for the death penalty); United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir.
1977) (concerning the types of action which can be grouped as one actus reus); supra notes 96-
106, 120-37 and accompanying text.
213. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2496-97. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text. But see
United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 462 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that the government must
prove at least one of the multiple theories of an indictment beyond a reasonable doubt to the
jury).
214. CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN
ANALYSIS OF CASES & CONCEPTS § 23.02(a) (2d. ed. 1986). The law requires less proof for an
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within the criminal justice system that one cannot accurately compare with
pre-trial stages of prosecution. 1
Justice Souter's treatment of the mens rea as equivalent to the actus reus is
illogical.2 6 Although several different acts may constitute the actus reus for
a particular crime, it does not follow that a variety of mental states, each
composed of separate elements, can satisfy the necessary mens rea require-
ment.217 The mens rea is more specific and the most decisive element in
modem day criminal justice.218  The law cannot procedurally interchange
one mental state with another.219 Assuming sufficient proof of the requisite
actus reus of a crime, a jury can convict a defendant only upon sufficient
proof of the necessary intent, unless a strict liability crime such as felony
murder is at issue.220 As Justice White asserted in his dissent, the intent to
rob does not reflect the same culpability as the intent to kill.22, The mens
rea to commit robbery is not the same mens rea for first-degree murder;
222
indictment than to convict a defendant. Some jurisdictions require a probable cause standard
for indictment, whereas others require a prima facie case. Id.
215. Capital cases are on a "different footing" than other crimes because it is the difference
"between life and death." Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring) (argu-
ing that more "process" is "due" to a capital defendant than to a defendant on a non-capital
crime). Furthermore, the death penalty is "unique in its severity and irrevocability." Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (holding that the death penalty is not too severe a punish-
ment for murder). When the life of the accused hangs in the balance, the Court is extremely
careful to ensure that every procedural safeguard is properly administered. Id.
216. Except for strict liability offenses, proof of the specific mens rea is a prerequisite to
guilt. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 3, § 3.5(e). The plurality relied upon State v. Serna, 211
P.2d 455, 459 (Ariz. 1949) (holding that the attempt to commit robbery involves the same level
of culpability as premeditation), cert. denied, Serna v. Walters, 339 U.S. 973 (1950). Schad,
111 S. Ct. at 2497 (plurality opinion).
217. The dangers of substituting mens rea is further complicated by the various subdivi-
sions of intent which courts have created-" 'criminal,' " 'constructive,' "" general,' " and
"'specific,' "- each of which has a unique meaning. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 3,
§ 3.5(e) (quoting some of the many words that courts have used to qualify "intent"). Further-
more, even within the actus reus element, the Court rejected the Gipson "groupings" test be-
cause it sought a more specific verdict. Schad, Ill S. Ct. at 2498-99.
218. A jury cannot convict an accused of an offense which he indisputably committed if he
did not have the necessary mens rea, unless it was a strict liability offense. See Hopkins, supra
note 24, at 397.
219. Schad, Ill S. Ct. at 2509. The Court looked "to narrower analytical methods of
testing the moral and practical equivalence of the different mental states that may satisfy the
mens rea element of a single offense," as opposed to retaining "a degree of flexibility in defining
the 'fact[s] necessary to constitute the crime' under Winship." Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
220. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2509 (White, J., dissenting).
221. Justice Souter declared, however, that "[i]t is particularly fanciful to equate an intent
to do no more than rob with a premeditated intent to murder." Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2509.
222. Id. at 2508. Justice White elaborated on this dichotomy:
Here, the prosecution set out to convict petitioner of first-degree murder by either
of two different paths, premeditated murder and felony murder/robbery. Yet while
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the mens rea for premeditated murder reflects a more culpable state of
mind.223 The felonist who kills while robbing may not bear malice, intend to
kill, or reflect upon a desire to kill.224 Typically, he merely has a desire to
rob-a profoundly different mens rea than that of premeditated murder.225
The plurality admitted that legislatures must not draft overly broad or
vague statutes that fail to inform people of average intelligence of the con-
duct that the law forbids.226 The plurality, however, did not discount the
Gipson "'distinct conceptual groupings' " test as a method for conceptualiz-
ing similar acts to satisfy the actus reus.22 7 Rather, the plurality found the
Gipson test too impractical and abstract for a trial court to apply.228 The
plurality conceded that although it found the Arizona first-degree murder
statute to be constitutional, the statute was unnecessarily broad, vague, and
general.229 In contrast, the dissent does not oppose all statutes that offer
alternative theories, only those statutes that criminalize materially different
types of conduct.23 °
these two paths both lead to a conviction for first-degree murder, they do so by diver-
gent routes possessing no elements in common except the fact of a murder.
Id. See also LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 16, § 7.5. But see State v. Serna, 211 P.2d 455, 459
(Ariz. 1949) (equating the mental state in robbery with premeditation in murder), cert. denied,
Serna v. Walters, 339 U.S. 973 (1950).
223. See supra note 222.
224. The mens rea for first-degree murder is imputed to him, however, by his "intent to
commit ... the underlying felony." Schad, Ill S. Ct. at 2508.
225. Id. Punishing a desire to rob as a desire to kill violates the accused's right to a unani-
mous jury verdict on elements of a crime that the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); Crowley, supra note 5.
226. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2497 (plurality opinion). However, vagueness principles do not
limit generic verdicts.
Although our vagueness cases support the notion that a requirement of proof of spe-
cific illegal conduct is fundamental to our system of criminal justice, the principle is
not dependent upon or limited by concerns about vagueness. A charge allowing a
jury to combine findings of embezzlement and murder would raise identical problems
regardless of how specifically embezzlement and murder were defined.
Id. at 2498 n.4.
227. Id. at 2498 (quoting United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453, 456-59 (5th Cir. 1977)).
The Court described groupings as "too indeterminate to provide concrete guidance to courts."
Id.
228. Id. Thus, the Court did not reject the idea of such "groupings," but found them to be
unworkable in practice. Id. at 2498-99.
229. Justice Souter noted that the plurality did not "suggest that jury instructions requiring
increased verdict specificity are not desirable." Id. at 2504.
230. Justice White declared, "[tihe problem is that the Arizona statute, under a single
heading, criminalizes several alternative patterns of conduct." Id. at 2509 (White, J.,
dissenting).
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In Schad, the plurality played an unduly passive role in reviewing the
state's statutory construction.23' First, the Court asserted that it must defer
to a state's initial interpretation of its statutes.232 Then, the Court declared
that a state statute's longevity entitles it to further deferential construc-
tion.233 The Court's reasoning seems circular. A statute does not automati-
cally satisfy due process solely by virtue of its longevity.2 34 Indeed, the
statute's longevity might be a factor simply because the Court deferred in
ruling on its initial constitutionality.235 By necessity, due process and its
requirements must evolve with the changing values of society.236 Accord-
ingly, the Court must periodically evaluate statutes-and modify them
231. Perhaps the original Pennsylvania statute in 1794 violated due process but was imple-
mented because the Court refused to intervene. Id. at 2502 (plurality opinion); see supra note
58.
232. See supra note 172.
233. The Court elaborated on the significance of historical support:
Where a State's particular way of defining a crime has a long history, or is in wide-
spread use, it is unlikely that a defendant will be able to demonstrate that the State
has shifted the burden of proof as to what is an inherent element of the offense, or has
defined as a single crime multiple offenses that are inherently separate. Conversely, a
freakish definition of the elements of a crime that finds no analogue in history or in
the criminal law of other jurisdictions will lighten the defendant's burden.
Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2501 (footnote omitted).
234. As stated in the frequently quoted lines from Justice Holmes:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down
in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was
laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation
of the past.
Oliver W. Holmes, Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
In contrast, the plurality insisted that historical or widespread acceptance is a "concrete
indicator [ ] of what fundamental fairness and rationality require." Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2501
(plurality opinion). Justice Scalia argued that "[i]t is precisely the historical practices that
define what is 'due.' 'Fundamental fairness' analysis may appropriately be applied to depar-
tures from traditional American conceptions of due process." Id. at 2507 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
235. Id. at 2500 (plurality opinion). Such an inference finds support from the Court's his-
torical hesitancy to "intrude upon the administration of justice by the individual States." Pat-
terson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977); cf Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134
(1954) (plurality opinion), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
236. "Due process, as th[e] Court often has said, is a flexible concept that varies with the
particular situation." Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). Despite argument that
the procedural reach of due process originally protected only those "rights recognized by his-
torical usage," the Court has consistently interpreted the requirement of due process with
"flexibility and breadth." LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 3, 2.4(a).
For example, prior to 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment did not exist. In Barron v. Balti-
more, 32 U.S. 243, 250-51 (1833), the Court ruled that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the
states. Instead, each state must establish a constitution of its own. Id. If the Framers had
intended that a constitutional provision apply to the states, it was so noted. See LAFAVE &
ISRAEL, supra note 3, § 2.2. The ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment also reflected the
changing values of society by granting citizenship to all blacks previously denied citizenship
because they were slaves. See id.; see also Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 397 (1857).
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where appropriate-in order for society to progress. 23" The Court in Schad
upheld the grouping of felony murder and premeditated murder under one
statute, reasoning that a defendant guilty of either crime could in some cir-
cumstance have achieved the same level of culpability.23 The plurality,
however, did not assert that the crimes are always equal, and state legisla-
tures should not treat them as such. 2 39 Rather than drafting its statutes with
alternative theories based upon theoretical possibilities and speculations,
state legislatures should group together only those acts that customarily rise
to the same level of culpability. 2 °
B. The Resounding Echo of Schad's Hollow Unanimity
Due process as espoused in Winship requires that the prosecutor prove
every fact necessary to constitute the alleged crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. 24 ' Thus, when a single statute authorizes the death sentence for both
premeditated murder and felony-murder, it reduces due process, jury una-
nimity, and the reasonable doubt standard to mere rhetoric.
242
The strict liability of felony murder automatically transfers the mens rea
from the underlying felony to the more serious felony of first-degree mur-
der.243 Although the law derives the mens rea for felony murder and pre-
meditated murder from different sources, 21 it is the grouping of these
mental states together as one crime that defeats the due process protections
offered by jury unanimity and reasonable doubt.245 Since murder in the
237. If, as Justice Scalia asserted in his concurrence, historical practice defines due process,
the Court's inquiry ends. See Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2506-07; text accompanying supra notes
180-83. But see supra note 234. The Court defines infractions that violate "fundamental fair-
ness" very narrowly. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352-53 (1990) (defining the
categories).
238. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2503. The plurality also admits that everyone need not agree that
the mens rea for premeditated murder and the mens rea for felony murder are moral
equivalents. Such equivalence need only be reasonably found. Id. at 2503-04.
239. Id.
240. As such, the legislature should punish alternative patterns of conduct according to
separate statutes. Id. at 2509 (White, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 2508; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
242. See Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2508-11; see also supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
243. See Sudduth, supra note 110, at 1326-27 (1984) (arguing that felony murder is uncon-
stitutional because the punishment is not proportional to the criminal act); supra note 24.
244. See supra note 24. Both theories lead to a conviction of the crime of first-degree
murder, but they do so by different routes because the elements are objectively different.
Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2508.
245. Id. at 2509. The concurrence admits that the plurality offered no reason why the two
theories need to be joined under one statute. See id. at 2507 (Scalia, J., concurring). Acts
which go under one "label" can be one offense and not violate the Constitution. If, however,
there is no way to group generically the two theories, they are not acceptable. See generally
Trubitt, supra note 163, at 559 (providing a background on jury theory, one's constitutional
right to trial by jury, and the validity of patchwork verdicts).
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midst of a felony and intentional murder are inherently different crimes with
dissimilar sentencing considerations,24 6 due process should treat the two as
separate offenses and require the state to prosecute them as such.24 7 How-
ever, where treated as one crime, the Court should not allow generic jury
verdicts because, although unanimous, they devalue jury verdicts and the
penal system as a whole.2 4 1 Instead, due process should require the jury to
attain unanimity upon the specific offense that the prosecution has proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.249 Furthermore, because of the severity of capi-
tal punishment, it should be subject to a more rigorous standard of proof.
250
By allowing state legislatures to combine alternative theories of first-degree
murder that share little in similarity, the Court dilutes this stringent stan-
dard of proof because the jury is not required to achieve a truly unanimous
verdict.2 5 '
The plurality in Schad intimated a desire for greater specificity in unani-
mous jury verdicts25 2 and noted that at a minimum, a defendant has a due
process right to know the crime of which a jury has convicted him.2 53 How-
ever, under Schad, even after an appeal to the Supreme Court, a defendant
may still be unsure of which theory the jury supported when it delivered its
generic unanimous verdict: murder in the midst of robbery or cold-blooded
246. See Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2510-11.
247. See id. at 2509 (White, J., dissenting); see also Stein, supra note 116, at 1786. If the
defendant is guilty of premeditated murder, the prosecutor should have to prove it as a sepa-
rate offense from felony murder, and the jury should have to agree unanimously upon that
offense. See Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2508-09. This would be another way to effectuate the modem
trend to limit the felony murder doctrine. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text. If
the prosecutor is unable to prove the mens rea for premeditated murder, due process should
require him to focus upon proving the separate crime of felony murder upon which the jury
must unanimously agree. The verdict would not properly inform the defendant of the crime of
which a jury convicted him. See Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2509.
248. A jury that unanimously agrees that someone was killed carries no impact. See
Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2497-98 (plurality opinion) (stating that a person cannot be generically
charged with "[c]rime;" due process requires that the prosecution allege a more specific infrac-
tion). In criminal cases, patchwork verdicts should only be tolerated where a single offense is
charged. See Trubitt, supra note 163, at 559; supra note 96.
249. See Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2509 (White, J., dissenting); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970).
250. See Crowley, supra note 5, at 1073. Before the death penalty becomes a viable option,
the law creates an additional threshold requirement of aggravating circumstances that must be
satisfied. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2511; see MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.7 (discussing premeditated
and felony murders); LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 16, § 7.7 (discussing premeditated and
felony murders); supra note 110 and text accompanying notes 116-37.
251. The Arizona legislature exceeded the confines of due process by combining the two
offenses under one statute. See Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2511.
252. See id. at 2504 (plurality opinion).
253. Id. at 2497-98.
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premeditated murder.254 Accordingly, a defendant who wishes to appeal his
death sentence based on a first-degree murder statute such as Arizona's
would have to defend himself against both theories, each containing dispa-
rate elements. 255 Even more frightening is the possibility that, as in Schad,
the sentencing judge may make the assumption that one theory prevailed in
the jury's generic unanimous verdict, although in reality it may not have
received any such support.2 56 Due to the shroud covering jury deliberations,




Due process requires that the prosecutor prove every element of a crime
beyond a reasonable doubt before a unanimous jury may convict an accused
of a capital offense. Because of the value of human life and the material
differences that exist between felony murder and premeditated murder, due
process should require the jury to agree unanimously upon the specific of-
fense. When the two theories are used as interchangeable alternatives, the
254. The petitioner in Schad fell into this category. When a jury delivers a general verdict,
the law presumes that it is based upon any charge to which the proof applies. People v.
Lymore, 185 N.E.2d 158, 159 (Ill. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 947 (1963); People v. Feagans,
457 N.E.2d 459, 465 (I11. App. Ct. 1983); see People v. Travis, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1149 (Iil.
App. Ct.), appeal denied, 530 N.E.2d 260 (III. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024 (1989). How-
ever, the sentencing judge decided that the jury had convicted Schad based on the theory of
premeditated murder. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2511 (1991) (White, J., dissenting). See text ac-
companying supra note 187.
255. See Schad, Ill S. Ct. at 2495 (plurality opinion); Stein, supra note 116, at 1789 (de-
claring that "the unique nature of the death penalty requires that every death penalty candi-
date be given individual consideration").
256. See Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2511 (White, J., dissenting); supra note 200 and accompany-
ing text. This situation runs contrary to the due process requirement espoused in Winship that
the prosecutor prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Furthermore, with respect to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause of the Eighth Amendment, "[a] penalty... should be considered 'unusually' imposed if
it is administered arbitrarily or discriminatorily." Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz,
Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1773, 1790 (1969) (asserting
that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment). See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
591-92 (1977) (holding that the Eighth Amendment rejects the death penalty for the crime of
rape of an adult woman because it is "excessive"); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05
(1978) (plurality opinion) (holding the sentencing judge must consider any mitigating evidence
that the defendant wishes to present). A majority of the Court adopted the Lockett plurality
opinion. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982).
257. United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1977). The secrecy of jury delib-
erations prevents any investigation to inform the accused of how the jurors cast their votes.
Id. The public may only question the jury on matters related to outside influences affecting the
deliberations. FED. R. EvID. 614. See Stein, supra note 116, at 1806 (concluding tht "[t]he
death penalty cases of the 1970s demonstrate that the Supreme Court will not accept a statute
that allows the death penalty be be imposed arbitrarily").
1993]
Catholic University Law Review
resultant jury unanimity lacks significance as the jury may have agreed only
that a killing took place. In Schad v. Arizona, the plurality held that due
process is satisfied when a jury reaches a unanimous verdict based on a stat-
ute that groups felony murder and premeditated murder together. Such
statutes, offering alternative theories composed of materially different ele-
ments, deny due process because they do not require the prosecutor to prove
each element beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, the jury achieves a
generic unanimity that is not only undecipherable to the defendant but am-
biguous in the appeal process as well.
In contrast to earlier stages of criminal prosecution, the death penalty is
too final a punishment to be based on a generic verdict. Due process must
require the prosecutor to meet a more stringent standard in a death penalty
case, not a lighter burden of proof. Since the crucial element of culpability is
most often defined as intent, the law should not transfer, substitute, or derive
intent based upon alternative theories. Due process requires that a defend-
ant is innocent until proven guilty. Thus, for a death sentence, due process
requires that the jury unanimously agree upon the mens rea as well as the
actus reus. Without such unanimity on the elements of a crime, jury una-
nimity is a due process sham.
Elizabeth R. Carty
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